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RE-SHAMING THE DEBATE: SOCIAL NORMS, SHAME, 
AND REGULATION IN AN INTERNET AGE 
KATE KLONICK* 
 Advances in technological communication have dramatically 
changed the ways in which social norm enforcement is used to 
constrain behavior.  Nowhere is this more powerfully 
demonstrated than through current events around online shaming 
and cyber harassment.  Low cost, anonymous, instant, and 
ubiquitous access to the Internet has removed most—if not all—of 
the natural checks on shaming.  The result is norm enforcement 
that is indeterminate, uncalibrated, and often tips into behavior 
punishable in its own right—thus generating a debate over 
whether the state should intervene to curb online shaming and 
cyber harassment. 
 A few years before this change in technology, a group of legal 
scholars debated just the opposite, discussing the value of 
harnessing the power of social norm enforcement through 
shaming by using state shaming sanctions as a more efficient 
means of criminal punishment.  Though the idea was discarded, 
many of their concerns were prescient and can inform today’s 
inverted new inquiry: whether the state should create limits on 
shaming and cyber bullying. Perhaps more importantly, the 
debate reintroduces the notion of thinking of shaming within the 
framework of social norm enforcement, thus clarifying the 
taxonomy of online shaming, cyber bullying, and cyber 
harassment. 
 This Article ties together the current conversation around 
online shaming, cyber bullying, and cyber harassment with the 
larger legal discussion on social norms and shaming sanctions.  
It argues that the introduction of the Internet has altered the 
social conditions in which people speak and thus changed the 
way we perceive and enforce social norms.  Accordingly, online 
shaming is (1) an over-determined punishment with indeterminate 
social meaning; (2) not a calibrated or measured form of 
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punishment; and (3) of little or questionable accuracy in who and 
what it punishes. 
 In reframing this problem, this Article looks at the viability of 
the legal, normative, private, and state solutions to controlling 
online shaming.  It argues that looking only to state regulation 
will be an inefficient and ineffective solution.  Instead, it proposes 
using the realizations from the shame debate, successful uses of 
online norm enforcement, and private remedies to inform the 
debate around state intervention. 
INTRODUCTION 
At Pycon, a tech developers’ conference in California, two men—Bob 
Smith and Fred Jones1—sat in the audience at a presentation about 
“dongles,” devices that attach externally to computers and mobile devices. 
With a giggle, Smith turned to Jones and muttered a half-thought-out joke 
about “big dongles” and “forking someone’s repo.”2  “It was so bad, I don’t 
remember the exact words,” he later said. “[Something] about a fictitious 
piece of hardware that has a really big dongle––a ridiculous dongle. . . .  It 
wasn’t even conversation-level volume.”3  The “joke” was overheard by a 
woman in the row in front of them, who stood up, turned around, and took 
their photograph.  She then tweeted the picture to her 9,209 followers with 
the subtitle, “Not cool.  Jokes about forking repo’s in a sexual way and 
‘big’ dongles.  Right behind me #pycon.”4 
The woman who took the photo, a thirty-something black Jewish 
developer named Adria Richards, followed the Tweet up the next day with 
a blog-post discussing the photo and the importance of accountability for 
“antinormative” behavior.5  In part because of the public outrage generated 
by Richards’s posts, Smith was fired.6 
Following his firing, Smith issued a public explanation and apology on 
another message board news site.7  In response, Smith started receiving 
                                                          
 1.  Bob Smith and Fred Jones are pseudonyms; both men’s real identities remain 
anonymous. 
 2.  Forking in tech talk means to copy another person’s software so you can work on it 
independently, change, and ideally improve on it.  The phrase “forking someone’s repo” is both a 
type of semi-flattery (in that imitation is flattery) and sexual euphemism (that is, exploiting 
another’s work entirely for your own benefit, with no benefit to them).  
 3.  JON RONSON, SO YOU’VE BEEN PUBLICLY SHAMED 112 (2015). 
 4.  Adria Richards (@adriarichards), TWITTER (Mar. 17, 2015, 5:32 PM), 
https://twitter.com/adriarichards/status/313417655879102464/photo/1. 
 5.  Adria Richards, Forking and Dongle Jokes Don’t Belong at Tech Conferences, BUT 
YOU’RE A GIRL (Mar. 18, 2013, 9:36 PM), http://butyoureagirl.com/2013/03/18/adria-richards-on-
dongle-jokes-and-pycon-2013/. 
 6.  RONSON, supra note 3, at 116. 
 7.  mr-hank, HACKER NEWS (Mar. 2013), https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5398681. 
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notes and gestures of support from various people who had been watching 
the events unfold online.  Richards, however, had started to receive the 
opposite: “A father of three is out of a job because a silly joke he was 
telling a friend was overheard by someone with more power than sense.  
Let’s crucify this cunt.”8 
Though Richards had initially enjoyed the positive attention from 
feminist and activists online for her post, she was now faced with a 
horrendous backlash.  Anonymous users sent violent pictures and threats of 
rape, kidnap, torture, and death via email and posted them on Internet 
message boards and comments.9  Richards’s employer was targeted by a 
distributed denial of service (“DdoS”) attack, which crippled their website 
and servers.  A group of anonymous attackers communicated the ransom: 
fire Richards, or the attacks will continue.  She was fired the next day; over 
a year later, she still does not have a job.10 
Richards’s and Smith’s stories demonstrate how low cost, anonymous, 
instant, and easy access to the Internet has eviscerated whatever “natural” 
limits there were to public shaming and has served to amplify its effects.11  
Now, any perceived violation of a social norm—a racist tweet,12 a sexist 
joke, taking up too much room on public transportation13—can result in 
immediate, prolific condemnation from millions of people all over the 
world.  Today, it is easier than ever to use shaming to enforce so-called 
social norms, and it is easier than ever for shaming to spin out of control. 
But these effects were not always so obvious.  Two decades before 
Smith and Richards were each shamed out of their employment, a number 
of legal scholars debated the possible merits of using government-
sponsored shaming sanctions as an alternative to imprisonment for non-
violent low-level offenses.  The debate, which grew out of a general interest 
at that time in using social norms to regulate, began with a paper by 
Professor Dan Kahan, which proposed shaming as an expressive and 
functional replacement to imprisonment, but at far less cost.14 
Taking place in the mid-1990s during a time largely innocent of the 
Internet, the debate that followed was in many ways prescient of the 
problems that would occur with online shaming.  Professors James 
Whitman and Eric Posner argued that shaming would create an 
                                                          
 8.  RONSON, supra note 3, at 120. 
 9.  Id. at 120. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of 
Law: The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662 (1998); see infra Part I. 
 12.  See infra Part II. 
 13.  See infra Part IV (describing “manspreading”). 
 14.  Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996).  
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uncontrollable spiral into mob justice.15  Professor Martha Nussbaum 
argued that shaming sanctions were contrary to human dignity, and instead, 
acts should be shamed, not people.16  Finally, Kahan, a decade after his 
initial article, recanted his previous position, claiming shaming was not as 
over-determined as prison and therefore less attractive to society.17 
A more thorough explanation of modern shaming, cyber bullying, 
cyber harassment, and social norms and a detailed analysis of the work 
from these scholars is included in Part I of this Article. 
In the ten years since the debate ended, public shaming as a means of 
enforcing social norms—totally separate from government-endorsed 
shaming sanctions—has continued, but changed dramatically.  Through a 
series of examples, Part II descriptively demonstrates how the rise of 
inexpensive, anonymous, instant, and easily accessible communication 
technology has removed natural limits on shaming.  The result is norm 
enforcement that is indeterminate, uncalibrated, and often tips into behavior 
punishable in its own right. 
Part III examines how the Internet and modern technology have altered 
the social conditions in which we speak and, in turn, changed how we 
enforce social norms.  Viewed within this framework of social norm 
enforcement, the modern examples of online shaming and harassment in 
Part II demonstrate that online shaming: (1) is an over-determined 
punishment with indeterminate social meaning; (2)  is not a calibrated or 
measured form of punishment; and (3) is of little or questionable accuracy 
as to who and what it punishes. 
With the debate thus reframed, Part IV will look at the viability of 
various proposed legal, normative, private, and state methods of controlling 
public shaming.  The question of the prudence of these limits—or their 
feasibility and necessity—brings us to a new modern iteration in the debate 
over norms, norm enforcement, and state action in an Internet era.  This 
Article argues that looking only to state regulation will be an inefficient and 
ineffective solution to unfettered norm enforcement.  Instead, it proposes 
using the realizations from the shame debate, successful uses of online 
norm enforcement, and private remedies to inform the debate around state 
intervention. 
                                                          
 15.  ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 93, 109 (2000); James Q. Whitman, What is 
Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060–68 (1998).  
 16.  See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, 
AND THE LAW 230–33 (2004); see also Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully 
Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 2157, 2179 (2001).  
 17.  Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075 
(2006).  
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I.  OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL NORMS, SOCIAL MEANING, AND SHAMING 
A.  Modern Shaming, Modern Harassment 
For such a recognizable emotion, defining shame is a surprisingly 
difficult task.18  Though there are disagreements on whether shame is 
related to disgust or embarrassment; a stigma or a result of a stigma; or the 
outcome of insult to human dignity, it can be generally agreed on as an 
unpleasant feeling that results from awareness that one has engaged in 
wrong or socially transgressive behavior.19  Shame is different than guilt or 
embarrassment, which can be considered internal and self-enforced feelings 
following bad behavior; shame is external and enforced socially.20 
Stories of people using shame to punish unfavorable behavior fill 
myths, stories, and art the world over.  In Greek myth, Myrrha was shamed 
and turned into a tree when she tricked her father into an incestuous 
union.21  In the Danish fairytale, “The Red Shoes,” a vain girl who insists 
on wearing ostentatious red shoes to church is then forced to wear them 
forever and dance continuously to her death.22  And of course, Nathaniel 
Hawthorne forever linked a scarlet “A” to adulterous women in America.23 
Such stories are not confined to fiction or to history.  In Kabul, a man 
accused of illicit sex was paraded through the streets.24  In China, 
prostitutes and other criminals are forced to parade publicly, and it is now 
common practice to require criminals to confess and atone on television 
before their trials.25  And in America, publishing the names of prostitutes’ 
                                                          
 18.  For example, see generally the lengthy discussion of shame in NUSSBAUM, supra note 
16; ANDREW P. MORRISON, THE CULTURE OF SHAME (1986); FRANCIS BROUCEK, SHAME AND 
SELF (1991), and of course the work of the participants in the debate discussed infra Part I.C. 
 19.  The Oxford English Dictionary definition of shame lists it first as “a painful feeling of 
humiliation or distress caused by the consciousness of wrong or foolish behavior.” Shame, 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2011). 
 20.  Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in 
Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 677–79 (1986) (discussing the role of norms and their 
enforcement via shame, in extralegal dispute resolutions). 
 21.  OVID, METAMORPHOSES BOOK X, 298–502 (Anthony S. Kline, trans., 2000) (c.8 C.E). 
 22.  HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, The Red Shoes in HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN’S 
COMPLETE FAIRY TALES (Wordsworth Editions 1998) (1845). 
 23.  NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (Classic Books International 2009) 
(1850). 
 24.  See Whitman, supra note 15, at n.6 (citing Terence White, Man Accused of Illicit Sex 
Paraded through Kabul Streets, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 14, 1996). 
 25.  Andrew Jacobs, China Seeks to End Public Shaming, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/28/world/asia/28china.html?_r=0; Anne Namam, Taking It to 
the Screens, Beijing TV Confronts the City’s Street Criminals, ASIA WEEK (July 19, 1996), 
http://edition.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/96/0719/feat2.html; Megha Rajagopalan, TV 
Confessions in China an Unsettling New Trend for Executives, REUTERS (Sept. 1, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-confessions-idUSBRE9800HJ20130901. 
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johns, or ordering those convicted of drunk driving to put bumper stickers 
on their cars declaring their crime, have continually made scattered 
appearances as court-ordered punishment.26 
One might wonder where shaming stops and bullying or harassment 
begins.  Bullying is generally understood among academics and educators 
as having to meet three criteria: (1) it must be verbal or physical aggression; 
(2) it must be repeated over time; and (3) it must involve a power 
differential.27  When talking about cyber bullying, the aggression is mostly 
verbal; using “threats, blackmail . . . gossip and rumors” and online 
personas or messages can be more cruel, vindictive, and mean.28  Cyber 
bullying also typically describes acts between children, but the same acts by 
adults could be considered cyber harassment. 
At least in part, cyber harassment “involves threats of violence, 
privacy invasions, reputation-harming lies, calls for strangers to physically 
harm victims, and technological attacks.”29  Though all of these things 
would also fall under a simple legal definition of harassment or abuse, the 
“cyber” distinction adds a critical element: the way in which “the Internet 
exacerbates the injuries suffered. . . . by extend[ing] the life of destructive 
posts.”30 
So what makes online shaming31 different from cyber bullying or 
cyber harassment?  Just like cyber bullying or harassment, it often involves 
repeated verbal aggression over time, but it has another key element: 
shaming also involves the attempt to enforce either a real, or perceived, 
violation of a social norm.  Online shaming often turns into cyber bullying 
and harassment the more attenuated the social actions become from the 
nexus of social norm enforcement.  Thus, an essay deriding a young girl for 
smiling in a selfie at Auschwitz might be considered shaming; anonymous 
emails sent three weeks later calling for the girl to die, be raped, or kill 
herself would be better considered cyber harassment. 
The definition of shaming hinges on social norms, but what is meant 
by social norms exactly?  The following Part briefly examines their use in 
                                                          
 26.  For a more thorough list of these types of crimes see Whitman, supra note 15, at 1061 
and Kahan, supra note 14, at 631–32. 
 27.  EMILY BAZELON, STICKS AND STONES: DEFEATING THE CULTURE OF BULLYING AND 
REDISCOVERING THE POWER OF CHARACTER AND EMPATHY 28 (2013) (citing DAN OLWEUS, 
BULLYING AT SCHOOL: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE CAN DO 142–52 (1993)). 
 28.  BAZELON, supra note 27, at 33–34 (citing Patricia A. Snell & Elizabeth K. Englander, 
Cyberbullying Victimization and Behaviors Among Girls: Applying Research Findings in the 
Field, 6 J. SOC. SCI. 510–14 (2010). 
 29.  DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 3 (2014). 
 30.  Id. at 4. 
 31.  I will use the term “online shaming” to refer to what is often called “public shaming” by 
the popular press. 
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the law, and then how it was once imagined that shaming could be used as a 
tool by the state. 
B.  Social Norms and Social Meaning 
Though norms had long been studied by sociologists, anthropologists, 
and economists, their identification and utility in the law is credited as 
being first realized by Professor Robert Ellickson in a 1986 article about 
cattle rangers in Shasta County, California,32 and expounded in a book he 
published in 1991.33  By the mid-1990s, the idea had been taken up by law-
and-economics scholars hypothesizing on the creation and use of social 
norms in modern regulation.34 
Though perhaps differing at the margins, there appears at least to be 
consensus around the definition and function of a social norm among these 
scholars.35  A social norm is a rule without an official source (like the 
government) enforced without the threat of any kind of official sanction 
(legal action), yet complied with, nonetheless.36  An individual’s 
compliance with the norm can be enforced externally by third parties, or 
internally by one’s self.37  Norms can be internalized and self-enforced, so 
that no third-party action is needed for them to be perpetuated.38  Self-
enforcement might be individual feelings of guilt or embarrassment for 
norm violation; or it could be feelings of elation or joy for norm 
compliance.39  As already discussed, external enforcement for norm 
violation might be shaming or ostracizing the violator from the group; or it 
could be honoring an individual for compliance with the norm. 
Norms and the law interact in three distinct ways to inform individual 
behavior: 
(1) Non-legal norms.  These are the unwritten codes that maintain 
civility and order in various pockets of society: the courtesy of giving your 
seat to an elderly person on the subway, flushing a public toilet after use, or 
walking up or down on the right side of stairs.  There is no legal or 
                                                          
 32.  See Ellickson, supra note 20, at 672–73. 
 33.  ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
(1991). 
 34.  Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 3 (2001). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON. 
REV. 365, 365 (1997).  Put in another, more active way, social norms are rules “governing an 
individual’s behavior that third parties other than state agents diffusely enforce by means of social 
sanctions.”  Ellickson, supra note 34, at 3.  
 37.  Posner, supra note 36. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Ellickson, supra note 34, at 3; see also Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, 
and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 345–50 (1997) (on esteem-based norms). 
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government punishment for violating these norms, only an individual’s 
internal enforcement, or enforcement on a violating individual by a third 
party. 
(2) Norm-informing law.  These are the codes of conduct or behavior 
that are enforceable both through the law and through external or internal 
enforcement: theft, drunk driving, and paying your taxes, are some 
examples.  Violating these laws (and consequently the norms that underlie 
them) results in legal punishment, which can be a proxy enforcer for the 
norms, or a complement enforcer to internal or third-party enforcement. 
(3) Law-informing norms.  Laws can also nudge norms in new 
directions.  This is seen with the rise in norms against racism, smoking, and 
judging stay-at-home dads.40 
At the same time that scholars began to discuss norms, they also began 
developing and discussing the concurrent idea of social meaning.41  A 
social norm is a standard that society generates to govern the behavior of its 
members.42  Social meaning is the converse: an act’s social meaning is 
determined by its relationship with society’s norms.43  Social meanings and 
social norms thus depend on each other.  Social norms function largely 
because people understand the social meaning of actions that deviate or 
comply with social norms.  Society then punishes, or rewards, deviance or 
compliance with its norms by identifying the social meaning of certain acts 
and compelling individuals to comply with them.  In this way, social norms 
allow society to compel individuals to behave in certain ways by attaching 
social meanings to various actions they take.44 
Norms, it was thus argued, could—or did—create order without law.45  
For legal economists, the “discovery” of norms and their role in legal 
analysis was akin to finding a vast untapped resource.46  In contrast to the 
expense of passing cumbersome government regulation and putting 
enforcement mechanisms in place, perhaps already-existing norms could be 
                                                          
 40.  See McAdams, supra note 39; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 
96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996) (discussing the role of law on changing norms around smoking, 
gender roles, and race). 
 41.  See McAdams, supra note 39. 
 42.  Lessig, supra note 11, at 680–81. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Not everyone believes that the distinction between social norms and social meaning is a 
worthwhile one.  For a thoughtful critique, see RICHARD MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS 
OF LAW (2015), at 165–68. 
 45.  Indeed, this was the title of the foundational book on the subject.  See ELLICKSON, supra 
note 33.  
 46.  Ellickson called it a “boomlet” in interest around norms.  Ellickson, supra note 34, at 3; 
see also, McAdams, supra note 39, at 344–47. 
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exploited as an independent and more efficient source of regulation.47  
Perhaps—in the right context—the law could even free ride on norms. 
C.  Shaming Sanctions Debate 
It was this idea of piggybacking on social norms to more efficiently 
achieve the goals of regulation that began the debate around shaming 
sanctions.  The players in this debate, and their relevant scholarship, are 
summarized in loose chronological fashion below. 
1.  Kahan 1.0 
The goal of What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?—as expressed by 
the author, Dan M. Kahan48—was not simply to support shaming 
punishments in place of prison, but rather to put forth social meaning49 as a 
necessary element to successful use of alternative sanctions.50 
To do this, Kahan (hereinafter Kahan 1.0) puzzled over America’s 
dependence on the prison system as a form of punishment.  If alternative 
sanctions like fines and community service were accepted51 as doing as 
good of a job deterring nonviolent offenders as prison, why were we still 
locking up our cheating bankers and drunk drivers?  What was it about 
imprisonment that Americans liked so much that they were willing to pay 
so much for it, even when better options were available?52 
Kahan 1.0 theorized the answer was that imprisonment played a more 
powerful expressive role in punishment, and therefore, it offered something 
extra that punishment like fines or community service did not.53  That 
expressive role, he theorized, was society’s “condemnation”54 or “moral 
disapprobation”55 of the offender’s act.  Thus, society is willing to accept a 
higher price tag to punish certain crimes, even where community service or 
fines would provide similar deterrence, for the expressive value it 
provides.56 
                                                          
 47.  See Kahan, supra note 14; see also Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 
62 U. CHI. L. REV 943 (1995). 
 48.  See Kahan, supra note 17, at 2077–81 (discussing and analyzing his original work from 
ten years prior). 
 49.  Id.  
 50.  See generally Kahan, supra note 14. 
 51.  Id. at 605–30. 
 52.  Id. at 592. 
 53.  Id. at 635–37. 
 54.  Id. at 606. 
 55.  Kahan, supra note 17, at 2077. 
 56.  Kahan, supra note 14, at 617–30. 
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The solution to this inefficiency, Kahan 1.0 proposed, could be found 
in shaming sanctions.  Shaming could be a “perfect cocktail” of alternative 
sanctions at a much lower cost than imprisonment, but with all the 
expressive satisfaction.57  The form that such shaming could take was split 
roughly into four categories: (1) Public Stigmatizing (an ad in a newspaper 
stating a domestic abuser beats women); (2) Literal Stigmatizing (a bumper 
sticker stating the driver was convicted of a DWI); (3) Self-Abasement (a 
ceremony or ritual publicly disgracing the offender); and (4) Contrition 
(forcing the violator to apologize).58  In such a way, judges or lawmakers 
handing out shaming sanctions would be capitalizing on established social 
norms and methods of denunciation.  Thus, shaming sanctions, Kahan 1.0 
argued, could be the solution to over-imprisonment that previous alternative 
sanctions could never be. 
2.  Massaro 
Writing in response to Kahan 1.0, Toni M. Massaro surveyed the 
“current”59 state of shame and shaming, looking to psychology, sociology, 
and culture before discussing its implications on legal reforms.60   Her 
critique was twofold, challenging first Kahan 1.0’s assumption that shaming 
sanctions would be as effective as imprisonment, and then his failure to take 
into account the effect shaming punishments might have on culture and 
government.61 
As to the former—the “Efficacy Concerns”—Massaro claimed that 
shaming punishments entailed far-too-many unknown variables to be 
reliable as a specific deterrent.  The power of a stigmatic shaming penalty to 
change an individual’s behavior would be highly dependent on the offender, 
the community the offender was shamed in, and the underlying crime.62  A 
gang leader, for example, might feel little or nothing at being forced to wear 
a sign labeling him as a drug trafficker in an already high-crime 
neighborhood. 
Massaro also cast doubt on the effectiveness of shaming penalties as 
general deterrence.63  In addition to the instability and unpredictability 
reasons above, she theorized that the current structure of modern society— 
“[w]e (collectively) are not Victorian England, the Colonies, or pre-World 
                                                          
 57.  Id. at 635–41; see also Kahan, supra note 17, at 2075.  
 58.  Kahan, supra note 14, at 631–34. 
 59.  “Current” being 1996. 
 60.  Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 645, 645–89 
(1997). 
 61.  Id. at 692–704. 
 62.  Id. at 692–93. 
 63.  Id. at 693–94. 
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War II Japan”—would make shaming ineffective.64  The lack of community 
conditions like neighbor-to-neighbor contact would mean that a shaming 
punishment might not actually have a shaming effect at all.65 
Massaro also pointed out that shaming sanctions did not take into 
account “private responses to the public penalty.”66  Prison, fines, and 
community service all had set endpoints—but shaming could have infinite 
impacts.  This made shaming not only difficult to calibrate as a proportional 
penalty to the crime, but also a possible impediment to an offender’s re-
integration into society.67 
Finally, Massaro discussed the alternative long-term reactions to 
shame: some offenders, once being shamed, might have violent secondary 
effects.  Feeling shamed by a community might create feelings of 
ostracization and ultimately encourage the offender to continue to act 
against the norms, or they might simply act violently out of anger.68  
Conversely, over time and frequency of use, shaming might simply become 
ubiquitous and lose its power as a tool of enforcing norms.69 
As to the latter of Massaro’s two main critiques—the “Social and 
Political Concerns”—she hypothesized more broadly to the long-term 
effects of shaming penalties on society.  Centrally, that official shaming 
would “erode decency norms” by normalizing cruelty through state 
action.70  Shaming might make certain offenders subject to them—perhaps 
drunk drivers, white-collar criminals, child molesters—less than human.71  
Shame’s close—or complementary—relationship with humiliation 
disgraces human dignity.  It is ultimately “the rejection of human beings as 
human.”72 
3.  Whitman 
Weighing in on the debate, James Q. Whitman cataloged and then 
analyzed what he found to be the most salient and relevant arguments 
against shaming sanctions.  He first discarded two of Massaro’s central 
ideas: that shaming sanctions cannot be effective in a modern society; and 
that shaming sanctions are bad because they are contrary to human 
                                                          
 64.  Id.  
 65.  For a more detailed analysis of this problem with shaming—its ineffectiveness in modern 
society—see Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 
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 70.  Id. at 699. 
 71.  Id. at 700. 
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dignity.73  Arguments that shaming sanctions will not work, he argued, are 
already disproven by modern courts’ continual reliance on them because of 
their very effectiveness.74  As to claims of shaming’s impact on human 
dignity, Whitman decoupled “dignity” from a definition in a broad human 
rights-based sense and traced it instead to a Victorian tradition of bodily 
dignity, which he argued as the dignity impacted by shaming.75  This 
dignity, he stated, “is gone throughout society” and thus, an ineffective 
claim against the use of shaming sanctions today.76 
Assuming these premises, Whitman broached what he described as the 
two “political” augments against shaming: the “liberal” argument that the 
state cannot inflict shaming sanctions even if they are effective, because 
moral coercion should be privately enforced; and the “statist” argument that 
the state can use shaming sanctions, but should not, because it could incite 
mob riots and a loss of state control.77 
The liberal argument Whitman derived from classical liberalism—
Rousseau to Mill—found shame to be a highly effective tool, but one that 
could only be wielded by the people.78  In other words, it was not the scarlet 
“A” itself that caused the shame, it was the public opinion about what that 
scarlet “A” represented—a judgment that would be present with or without 
the state-sponsored signage.79  While recognizing the truth in this, Whitman 
cast doubt on the theory’s modern applicability in an age with mass media 
and politics: “It is difficult, in light of some hard experience, to believe that 
the state cannot succeed in destroying reputations.”80  Finally, Whitman 
argued that “statist” arguments—that public shaming sanctions might incite 
mob rioting—address a dangerous reality to shaming sanctions, but that 
government cannot shirk from action merely because of a fear of riots.81 
Having taken on each argument against shaming sanctions, Whitman 
made his most convincing assessment of their danger: that shaming 
sanctions “involve a dangerous willingness, on the part of the government, 
to delegate part of its enforcement power to a fickle and uncontrolled 
general populace.”82  The menace in “lynch justice,” he argued, is not only 
its subjectivity to the mercurial whims of a mob, but its potential to subject 
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 74.  Id. at 1068. 
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 78.  Id. at 1085–86. 
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the offender to unending punishment.83  Whitman called this potential 
infinite punishment by the mob, a violation of “transactional dignity”—a 
dignity he claimed arises from our belief that one should be able to “pay off 
a debt once and for all and be done with our creditor.”84  Shame sanctions’ 
danger, then, was that they undermined an “ethic of restraint and sobriety” 
as well as a sense of “measured punishment.”85 
4.  Posner 
In Law and Social Norms, Eric Posner took a historical look at 
shaming penalties, and argued that they have often proven unreliable.86  
Similar to those arguments made by Massaro, Posner discussed the 
imprecision of being able to calculate the effect of shame on any one 
individual’s reputation but added a secondary level of complication: the 
imprecision of a third-party’s desire to punish certain crimes.87 The primary 
motive to shame, Posner argued, is not justice, but rather enhancing one’s 
own reputation.88  This leads people to join in shaming not just to deter 
future norm violation, but also to bolster their own worth in the eyes of the 
community—or, as is seen in the example of organized crime, to join the 
group to avoid its ire being turned on you.89 
Additionally, Posner argued, shaming often has undesirable spillover 
effects on innocents.  Such is the case when the family of an offender is 
also shamed, even when they had no role in the violation.90  This high level 
of variance, he claimed, does not mean that shaming punishments are 
ineffective, but rather that “the ‘average’ shaming punishment is not likely 
to produce the optimal level of deterrence at the margin.”91 
Posner also claimed that shaming punishments would create deviant 
sub-communities.  Using the example of prostitution, he suggests that those 
offenders who value visiting prostitutes more than they do the potential cost 
of shaming, will continue to engage in the behavior—and when caught, and 
shamed, will either be forced to “turn to a life of crime” and/or form a sub-
community.92  If the punishment for prostitution is not shaming, but 
                                                          
 83.  Id. at 1089. 
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imprisonment, Posner posited, those members will be removed from the 
dominant population without the risk of the creation of a sub-community.93 
Posner’s issues with shaming sanctions differ from other theorists in 
fact, but not theory.  The heart of Posner’s two claims—that shaming 
sanctions are messy and create undesirable externalities—is quite similar to 
that expressed by Massaro and Whitman, and the problem of the 
government being unable to control “the level of ostracism that it 
provokes.”94 
5.  Nussbaum 
In her 2004 book Hiding Humanity, Martha C. Nussbaum devoted a 
chapter to the specific question of shaming citizens and dismantling the 
argument for government shaming sanctions.95  To wit: 
The fact that the state is complicit in the shaming makes a large 
difference.  People will continue to stigmatize other people, and 
criminals are bound to be among those stigmatized.  For the state 
to participate in this humiliation, however, is profoundly 
subversive of the ideas of equality and dignity on which liberal 
society is based.96 
Five distilled arguments, many of which have already been surveyed 
here, are cited to bolster her point.  First, Massaro’s argument that shame 
penalties diminish human dignity; then Whitman’s stance that shaming 
penalties would lead to an anarchist mob justice; third, Posner’s position 
that shame punishments are simply too unreliable to be a government 
position; then again, the arguably “dignity”-based argument that shame-
based deterrents would “break the spirit” of offenders;97 and finally, that 
shame-based penalties would ultimately just be one more form of ever-
increasing government control.98 
From this panoply, Nussbaum laid the most consequential weight with 
the question of shaming sanctions’ impact on human dignity: that shaming 
sanctions will inevitably inflict their greatest weight on “vulnerable 
minorities,” a particularized example of a greater problem of shaming 
penalties’ effects on individual dignity.99  Nussbaum also argues that 
shaming is too harsh to use in a civilized society because it targets the 
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person (“you are bad”) instead of the person’s acts (“you did a bad thing”) 
and thus “marks” a person “defective” in society with a degraded 
identity.100 
6.  Kahan 2.0 
In 2006, ten years after his proposal for shaming as an alternative 
sanction in place of imprisonment for low-level offenses, Kahan 
recanted.101  Setting aside the arguments of his detractors, he acknowledged 
that shame was “an unacceptable alternative sanction” for much of 
society—though for completely separate reasons than his critics had put 
forth.102  The true problem with shame sanctions, Kahan (hereinafter Kahan 
2.0) argued, was that humans liked to shield or hide their desire for 
expressive punishment, and while imprisonment accounts for this, shaming 
punishments do not.103  Imprisonment, in its blanket and multipurpose 
punitive capacity, was “expressively over determined”—and thus many 
different types of people, from all walks of life, could find whatever 
meaning and affirmation of their values from that punishment.104 
Explained differently, when Person A is sent to prison for X offense, 
the possible reasons for sending her to prison are multiple and their 
application inexact: Person A might be in prison for rehabilitation, or 
specific deterrence, or general deterrence, or retribution, or some 
combination of all of the above.  The punishment of prison does not have a 
single determinate meaning—it is “over determined.” 
But the same is not true of the punishment of shaming.  While shaming 
can be a punishment in search of future deterrence, the most blatant social 
meaning of shaming is group retribution; or as Kahan 2.0 puts it: a highly 
expressive and determined punishment.  Thus, by providing this slightly 
circular formulation, Kahan 2.0 gives the “real” reason shaming sanctions 
will not work: people favor prison to shaming because prison gives people a 
wider range of motives to hide behind than shaming gives. 
In the context of modern-day online shaming, the shame sanctions 
debate is more than a simple, somewhat ironic, historic hook—“Once we 
talked about the government using shame, now we’re talking about the 
government curbing shame!”—it is actually a valuable study of the role 
shaming has had in our society and the role it plays in enforcing a 
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normative culture.  By thinking of shaming within the framework of social 
norm enforcement, the impact of the Internet can be better understood and 
the taxonomy of online shaming, cyber bullying, and cyber harassment can 
make more sense. 
The next Part sets the stage for that discussion.  Part II examines how 
the low-cost, ubiquitous, anonymous, and instant nature of the Internet has 
changed the natural limits on shaming and how it functions as social-norm 
enforcement in modern society. 
II.  SHAMING AND THE INTERNET 
The Internet is a normative place.  That it would be such was 
envisioned by the Father of Social Norms, Robert Ellickson, in a response 
piece in the midst of the shame debate: “The fierce and (so far) largely 
successful resistance to government regulation of those involved with the 
Internet illustrates how members of a significant new social group have 
opted to make norms, not law, their social-control instrument of choice.”105 
Ellickson’s observation was and continues to be correct: norms are the 
primary social control mechanism of the Internet.106  The far greater 
change, however, is that the Internet has altered the “social conditions in 
which people speak” and thus changed the way we perceive and enforce 
social norms.107 
Before the Internet, if a woman in Des Moines decided to steal all the 
sugar packets at a restaurant and then empty the salt and pepper shakers into 
a bag in her purse, she might be given a sideways glare by patrons and 
brusque treatment from the waitress, and, at worst, asked to leave.  Today, a 
twelve-year-old can capture the freeriding café patron in a fifteen-second 
video, upload it to Facebook, and tell the whole town, the whole city, the 
whole country, the whole world: “GOT SALT AND PEPPER?! LOL MS. 
SMITH IS HOARDER.”  A banker in New York can watch the video on 
                                                          
 105.  Robert Ellickson, Social Norms, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. 
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YouTube, type in a comment under his anonymous handle, and add: “crazy 
bitch!” before forwarding it to twenty of his closest friends.  The woman’s 
identity and actions can circulate indefinitely around the Internet. 
This example, and the next three true stories, demonstrate three things 
about online shaming: 
(1) Its social meaning is indeterminate.  While the original shaming act 
might have been about shame, the following actions have unclear social 
meaning (Why did the banker type that? Was he reacting to her stealing? Or 
just bored? Or just mean?).  Shame could also have nothing to do with why 
a person is called out. 
(2) Its effects are uncalibrated.  The low-cost, anonymous and endless 
nature of the Internet means that Ms. Smith’s shame goes on forever, which 
seems harsh punishment for the theft of a few sugar packets.108 
(3) Its accuracy is questionable.  Viewers, including those in the 
restaurant, have no way of really knowing what is happening.  Maybe Ms. 
Smith was given permission to take the salt, pepper, and sugar.  Maybe she 
is abjectly poor and needs it to survive.  Or maybe she really is just a 
hoarder.  No process exists to determine truth, or between act and 
punishment. 
This Part contains three stories that each illustrate some or all of the 
following qualities of online shaming or cyber harassment.109   Though they 
are admittedly anecdotal, they are by no means isolated,110 and are valuable 
for what they can illuminate about modern online norm enforcement and 
the thin line between online shaming, harassment, and bullying. 
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A.  Gene Cooley111 
On September 11, 2008, Gene Cooley was at his job as a hairdresser 
when he got a call from local police informing him that his fiancée, Paulette 
Harper, had been murdered.  Harper had been shot by her ex-husband—
against whom she had a restraining order for previous incidents of 
violence—who had then turned the gun on himself.112 
Cooley and Harper lived in Blairsville, Georgia, a small town of 650 
residents in the north part of the state.113  Less than a week after Harper’s 
death, a thread discussing the murder appeared on Topix, a local news and 
message board site.114   Participants on Topix message boards could post 
and comment on news items instantly, anonymously, and without 
moderation.  Though starting off sympathetic, the comments on the thread 
about Harper’s death had quickly turned derogatory, specifically in regard 
to Cooley.115 
One user with the handle “Calvin” had insinuated that Cooley had 
played a part in the murder and that Harper’s family was at risk.  Another 
                                                          
 111.  Cooley’s story is not isolated.  See also Ulrike Dauer & Lisa Fleisher, Former Formula 
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the Newtown Elementary school shootings law enforcement officials mistakenly transposed the 
first name of Adam Lanza, the suspect and shooter, with his brother, Ryan, leading to Ryan 
Lanza’s erroneous, immediate, and prolific vilification); Sarah Michael, ‘OK People, Take a Look 
at This Creep!’: Man Who Mum Shamed on Facebook Because She Thought He Was Taking 
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Children, DAILY MAIL AUSTRALIA (May 8, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
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picture of man on Facebook she mistakenly thinks is taking a picture of her children and suggests 
he is a child molester, post is shared over 20,000 times, man is questioned by police).  
 112.  Complaint, Cooley v. Ballew, on file with author.  See also This American Life: Tarred 
and Feathered, CHICAGO PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-
archives/episode/522/transcript.  
 113.  This American Life, supra note 112, at 2. 
 114.  Id. at 2–3. 
 115.  Id. at 3. 
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user “Mouth” added that Cooley could not be trusted around children and 
that he was a pervert.  In comments on the thread, Calvin replied to Mouth, 
thanking Mouth for the warning.  Someone else with the pseudonym 
“Bugs” wrote that Cooley was a heavy drug user and had cheated on his 
first wife extensively.116 
In the days and weeks that followed, the comments continued to add 
up.  Cooley was called a pervert, pagan, creep, child molester, adulterer, 
liar, drunk, and wife-beater.  Users on Topix even suggested he was 
responsible for Harper’s murder, and then in the same breath, as if the ideas 
were of equal value, would mention Cooley had been fired from every job 
he had ever held.117 
It is crucial to note that none of these allegations were true.  Cooley 
had never used drugs, been accused of violence or excessive drinking, or 
practiced paganism, and he did not have anything in his past to suggest 
perversion.118  But in the small town of Blairsville, such idle remarks had 
immediate effect: Cooley was ignored by friends and acquaintances, at best, 
and at worst, called obscenities and not allowed into certain places of 
business.119  At work, all his clients stopped having him cut their hair, and 
the salon’s owner asked him, politely, to quit because his presence was 
driving away business.120  The effect went outside the small town of 
Blairsville, too: Harper’s family in Florida had seen the posts, and stopped 
speaking with Cooley; Cooley’s grown children cut off contact upon seeing 
the posts. 
Two and a half months after Harper’s death, Cooley had lost his 
family, friends, and his job, and he was unable to get another.  After sixteen 
years in Blairsville, he left and moved to Augusta.  He also hired an 
attorney, who successfully managed to subpoena Topix for the identities of 
the users who had defamed Cooley.  Calvin, Bugs, Mouth, and a host of 
others all turned out to be the same person: a 52-year-old woman named 
Sybil Denise Ballew, who had briefly worked at the same local department 
store as Cooley in 1999.121  Cooley had no memory of Ballew, but Ballew 
remembered him well and justified her disregard for him based on the “way 
he looked at the younger girls in staff.”122 
Whatever her alleged justifications for libeling Cooley, in 2011 a jury 
awarded him a $404,000 judgment for defamation of character and libel, 
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$250,000 of which was punitive damages.  Though Ballew has yet to pay 
on this judgment (it appears she is judgment-proof), the verdict has allowed 
Cooley to reclaim his life.  He has repaired his relationships with friends 
and family and moved back to Blairsville, where he claims people treat him 
like nothing ever happened.123 
B.  Justine Sacco124 
Justine Sacco, a corporate communications director at a large 
American Internet media company, was boarding a plane in Heathrow on 
her way to visit family in South Africa when she shot off a quick Tweet: 
“Going to Africa.  Hope I don’t get AIDS.  Just kidding.  I’m white!”125 
Eleven hours later Sacco landed in Cape Town, and turned on her 
phone to learn she was “the No. 1 worldwide trend on Twitter.”126  Though 
she had only 170 followers on her Twitter account when she had taken off, 
she now had tens of thousands of replies and responses to her AIDS tweet.  
The genesis of the outrage was an anonymous tipster to Sam Biddle, an 
editor at Valleywag, a subsidiary of Gawker Media.  Biddle had retweeted 
Sacco’s offensive Tweet to 15,000 followers, and then written a brief post 
about it on the site titled “And Now, a Funny Holiday Joke from IAC’s P.R. 
Boss.”127 
In the mere hours it took Sacco to reach Cape Town, a literal mob had 
amassed on Twitter to track her flight and shame her in person.  Rallied 
around the hashtag “#HasJustineLandedYet,” people around the world 
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tracked Sacco’s flight, with one user going so far as to go to the Cape Town 
International airport to photograph and live-tweet her arrival.128  Other users 
and the site BuzzFeed combed through her Tweets and compiled lists of 
previous offenses in a post titled, “16 Tweets Justine Sacco Regrets.”129  
Her employer fired her and Sacco cut her family vacation short due to 
safety concerns (people were threatening to go on strike at hotels she was 
staying at and her movements were being publicly tracked).  She returned to 
New York, jobless and isolated.  Both applying for new employment and 
rebuilding a social life proved incredibly difficult because “we Google 
everyone.”130 
Eventually Sacco left New York, volunteering as a public relations 
agent at an NGO in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia that worked to lower maternal-
mortality rates.  Though her negative Internet profile had not diminished, 
she eventually returned to New York to take a new public relations job—a 
move that was noted and mocked online.  Though she has received a public 
apology from Biddle, Sacco acknowledged that she still felt personally 
humiliated.131 
C.  Jill Filipovic132 
A first year law student at New York University, Jill Filipovic was at 
her parents’ house recovering from a wisdom teeth extraction over winter 
break when she was alerted that she was the topic of hundreds of threads at 
Auto Admit, an anonymous message board for law students.133  Filipovic 
went to the webpage to discover hundreds of comments discussing her rape 
and murder.134  A feminist writer who published her own blog, Filipovic 
was used to receiving harassing comments on posts, or even the occasional 
email, but the Auto Admit threads were different.  “What freaked me out 
about Auto Admit was it was people claiming to have seen me in person,” 
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Collins, Anita Sarkeesian on GamerGate: ‘We have a Problem and We’re Going to Fix This’, 
ROLLING STONE (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/anita-sarkeesian-
gamergate-interview-20141017.  
 133.  Jill Filipovic, Let’s Be Real: Online Harassment Isn’t Virtual for Women, 
TALKINGPOINTSMEMO.COM CAFÉ (Jan. 10, 2014), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/let-s-be-
real-online-harassment-isn-t-virtual-for-women. 
 134.  Id. 
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Filipovic recalls.  “Through blogging I’ve meant crazy commenters and 
harassers before, but these people were claiming that they were in my real 
life—my off-line life.”135  Also daunting was the fact that Filipovic’s 
selection as a target for the hateful posts had no discernable link to anything 
she had said or done: “Apparently, it had been going on for many months, I 
have no idea how it began, even after I read all of the posts.”136 
Even though they existed “virtually” the Auto Admit posts had a 
dramatic effect on Filipovic’s life, and most immediately on her time in law 
school: she stopped speaking in class, wore hoodies to shield her face, and 
made no friends.137  Online, Filipovic would obsessively and painfully 
monitor the threads, even though she understood it made the trauma 
continually worse.138  And she would try to stop it: when a picture of her in 
a bikini was posted on one of the threads, she sent an email to Auto Admit 
requesting its takedown.  “They refused,” she recalled. “And then they 
printed my email on the website.”139 
Finally, Filipovic sought justice from her online supporters calling for 
“personal-political collective action”:140 
Please feel free to copy any or all of what I’ve written here to 
your own blog in order to help change the top-ranked search 
engine results for Jill Filipovic.  If you don’t have your own blog 
then please at least link to one of Jill’s post[s] listed below at your 
preferred social networking site and give it the tag ‘Filipovic.’141 
The gambit worked, and by March 2007 top results for “Jill Filipovic” were 
again about her bio or articles, and the reputational threads had fallen off 
the page.142 
Still, to this day, Filipovic continues to get the occasional Google alert 
that she is again a topic at Auto Admit.  Moreover, the long-term effects of 
the posting continue: “When I’d be at an event and people would glance at 
my nametag, I used to have a brief flash of panic. That’s gone away, but 
always being alert and on guard? That’s stayed.”143 
                                                          
 135.  Telephone Interview with Jill Filipovic (July 27, 2015).  
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  CITRON, supra note 29, at 70. 
 141.  Id. 70–71. 
 142.  Id. at 71. 
 143.  Telephone Interview, supra note 135. 
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III.  RE-SHAMING THE DEBATE 
To review: much of the appeal of shaming sanctions is that they would 
allow the state to piggyback on how society enforced its own norms.  In 
practice, this would mean using the authority and voice of the state to put an 
offender into the public consciousness to be shamed.  Under normal 
conditions, when a state punishes, it does three things: 
(1)  It gives an official social meaning to the punishment.  The 
punishment is for stealing; or rape; or money laundering, etc. 
(2)  It calibrates the punishment.  It designates what it will entail and 
how long it will last.  Except in certain exceptions this is for a set period of 
time and when completed an offender can begin again. 
(3)  It strives for accuracy.  A process is in place to attempt to discern 
whether the right person is being punished, whether the charges against 
them are true, and whether circumstances should enhance or mitigate 
punishment.  While the process is far from perfect, it is present. 
In the days before the Internet, Kahan and others imagined that 
government-issued shame punishment could bring these elements to 
normative punishments, and that normative punishments would also curbed 
by natural limits: a trial or judge would determine the accuracy of your 
crime.  Your crime would be publicized.  If a yard sign was placed in your 
yard calling you a drunk driver, only a certain number of people in your 
small community, if they walked by, would witness and take part in your 
shame.  The length of your punishment—apart from the actual public or 
literal stigmatizing—was proscribed by the weaknesses of human memory 
and the limited potential for mouth-to-mouth gossip.  Shaming someone 
also took actual effort, and also put the shamer at risk himself.  Kahan 2.0 
was not wrong when he categorized shaming as less over-determined than 
prison: before the Internet, shaming was something quite specific. 
But online shaming is different from the shaming imagined in the 
shame debate because the Internet places cultural participation and 
interaction in a new light.144  Because of this, shame is a punishment meted 
out separately from any kind of government oversight or coordination.  This 
means that the social meaning of shame can turn into harassment or 
bullying; the accuracy of shaming can be non-existent or questionable; and 
the Internet’s endless memory, ubiquity, and ease of access can make 
punishment for a norm violation outsized and uncalibrated from the 
underlying offense.  As analyzed here, the examples in Part II supra 
demonstrate that since the rise of the Internet, modern social-norm 
                                                          
 144.  Balkin, supra note 107, at 2. 
 1052 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:1029 
enforcement has dramatically changed and now lacks reliable social 
meaning, calibration, and accuracy. 
A.  Indeterminate Social Meaning 
Norms change.145  They can change organically (taking a picture of 
yourself in public might have been normatively “vain” ten years ago, but 
“selfies” are now a fun, and commonplace practice); or they can change at 
the urging of laws and regulation (legal desegregation made it difficult for 
continued overt norms of racism to be accepted).  But beyond the norms 
themselves the Internet has changed how norms are enforced, and what 
norm enforcement means.  A top-down example will serve to illustrate the 
mechanisms in play in online norm violations: 
 
Here is an example of a norm: 
 
 




And here is the social meaning 
of that act in light of our norms: 
 
 
And here is an example of an 
act of norm enforcement: 
 
 
And here is an example of one 




This chain of events demonstrates two things: first, that every act has a 
social meaning, as Lessig describes, but second, that the very act of norm 
enforcement has a distinct social meaning.  While the social meaning of 
some acts of shaming might be relatively clear—writing a lengthy blog post 
                                                          
 145.  McAdams, supra note 39, at 391–92.  
People should not say racist 
things. 
White girl makes public 
statement that only black 
people get AIDS. 
 
White girl has violated norm 
that disfavors racism. 
Third-party writes blog post 
on news media site about 
white girl’s racist Tweet.  
 
White girl has violated a 
norm for Tweeting racist 
Tweet and should be 
shamed. 
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on how Sacco’s words are a shameful example of racism today—many are 
not. 
What is the social meaning of re-Tweeting a link to a lengthy blog post 
about a racist girl?  It could be re-Tweeted out of boredom.  It could be re-
Tweeted to shame.  It could be re-Tweeted out of misogyny.  It could be re-
Tweeted as a piece of humor.  It could be re-Tweeted sadistically.  It is 
impossible to determine the act’s precise meaning from the act alone. 
This indeterminacy is true of the vast majority of online acts of social 
norm enforcement—re-Tweeting a message; sharing a link; commenting 
anonymously on a blog; liking something on Facebook—the acts 
themselves are so small, discrete, and instant that they do not necessarily 
have a clear social meaning.  But, as Part III.B explains, this does not curb 
their power. 
B.  Calibration 
A central fear, expressed by almost all of the critics in the shame 
debate, was the uncontrollable, and unpredictable nature of shaming.  This 
was stated in various ways, but perhaps best described by Whitman as the 
loss of “measured punishment” or “transactional dignity.”146  Whitman 
predicted shaming would deprive offenders of such measured punishment 
by subjecting them “to the public’s unpredictable response” and denying 
them “the dignity that comes from our right to pay off a debt once and for 
all and be done with our creditor.”147  Thus, shame sanctions cede power to 
punish from the state to the mob, and in doing so surrendered all rational 
control over the effects. 
With norms, however, the government does not have to cede the 
power—the public already has it.  And while the public was always armed 
with its own tools and means of norm enforcement, the ready availability, 
low-cost, and anonymity of modern technology and the Internet has 
drastically changed whatever natural limits formerly conscribed shaming.  
The Lynch Mob imagined by Whitman, Massaro, and Nussbaum would be 
naturally constrained by geography, time, and expense.  Before the Internet, 
shaming took time, money, and physical presence: someone had to show up 
to protest you, or see you walk by with a sign around your neck.  People in 
Eugene, Oregon, were not going to get in a car and drive to Jackson, 
Mississippi to shame a drug dealer who dealt pot to elementary school kids.  
And people in Jackson had to make a calculation of being seen by others in 
their community if they decided to shame someone.  In terms of time, 
money, and personal reputation, shaming was expensive. 
                                                          
 146.  Whitman, supra note 15, at 1090. 
 147.  Id. 
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But the Internet, and access to it, has made shaming cheap, and as a 
result, an Internet Lynch Mob has no such constraints.  To Sacco, Cooley, 
Smith, and Richards, the online reactions came in a tidal wave that felt like 
unified public condemnation.  To them it was the entire world saying they 
were just bad; to the rest of the world, Sacco was just a millisecond of time 
and one more favorited Tweet; Cooley was just one more forwarded e-mail; 
and Smith was another “SMDH”148 comment on a thread. 
The same qualities about the Internet and technology that remove the 
limits on norm enforcement also amplify shaming’s effects.  Not only can 
online shaming be a “tidal wave,” it can be a never-ending tidal wave.  
Months after Sacco’s life was upended by her Tweet, her online presence is 
still populated with public vitriol.  Richards continues to fight a battle to 
reclaim her online reputation.  Almost everyone mentioned in these 
examples lost their jobs or were forced to relocate because of online 
shaming.  The punishments are both extreme and endless and seem deeply 
uncalibrated to the transgressions: a moment of mindless public racism; a 
private, vaguely sexist comment; a blog post calling someone out for being 
sexist.  Endless public shaming and loss of livelihood seem like extreme 
consequences for such offenses—and they happen even when no offense 
has occurred, as Part III.C explains. 
C.  Accuracy 
Ideally, when the state punishes, it has applied a process to determine 
whether the person being punished has in fact committed the thing for 
which they are being punished.  No such measure exists in norm 
enforcement and the Internet’s ability to amplify social norm enforcement 
punishment is made even worse when there was no actual norm violation to 
cause it. 
Such was the case with Cooley, who was libeled as a murderer, child-
molester, and debtor.  Though Cooley was innocent of such actions, the 
mere presence of these accusations of norm violation was enough to trigger 
online, and then real-life, shaming. 
In comparison, there was no false or even proffered norm violation to 
explain the harassment Filipovic received.  Her example effectively 
delineates the taxonomic difference of how the same actions (excessive 
online shaming) in one case should be considered online shaming or 
defamation, while in another the same action should be considered cyber 
harassment.149 
                                                          
 148. SMDH is an acronym typically used in social media contexts to stand for “Shaking My 
Damn Head.” 
 149.  The importance of this delineation is discussed infra Part IV. 
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The stories of Cooley, Filipovic, and in some ways Richards also 
highlight how the Internet gives factional groups a disproportionate amount 
of power and visibility.  Thus, the whims of a group of misogynistic 
teenage hackers or one irrational individual with a vendetta and a dial-up 
connection can be enforced at a much higher propensity and representation 
than they might actually hold in society.  These groups can exact shaming 
punishments that tip-toe—nay, stomp—into realms of harassment and 
bullying.  Moreover, their power can be—and often, is—unchecked.  This 
is both because of anonymity but also because of a fear that any attempts to 
speak out against these groups will only turn their retributive gaze on you––
as Filipovic found out in her requests to Auto Admit. 
As demonstrated above, modern technology and the Internet have 
altered social norm enforcement and removed the natural limits, which once 
made shaming a relatively viable solution to norm violations.  Instead, in 
this new era, shaming is an indeterminate, inaccurate, and uncalibrated form 
of punishment.  Twenty years after legal scholars debated using shame as a 
tool of the state, the conversation has shifted to whether and how the state 
can best curb shaming.  The next Part will look at how realizations from the 
shame debate, successful uses of online norm enforcement, and private 
remedies to inform the debate around state intervention. 
IV.  THE FUTURE OF ONLINE SHAME 
While this Article has thus far focused on when online shaming goes 
wrong, there are some examples of when shaming goes right.150  One such 
example is the online meme known as “manspreading.”  The origins of the 
“manspreading” campaign are unclear.  At least one blog, “Your Balls Are 
Not That Big,” has intermittent posts starting in September 2011.151  
Another Tumblr, “Men Taking Up Too Much Space on the Train,” has 
archives starting in May 2013152 and countless Tweets featuring pictures of 
offenders hashtagged with “#manspreading” before The New York Times 
“officially” recognized the trend in December 2014.153  But like many 
campaigns that take hold via social media, the exact naissance is a bit of a 
                                                          
 150.  For further discussion around the potential benefits of shaming see JENNIFER JACQUET, 
IS SHAME NECESSARY? (2015).  See also DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION (2006) 
(arguing that some shaming can be positive when it gives voice to the generally-voiceless, as seen 
in consumer service forums or street harassment campaigns like Hollaback). 
 151.  YOUR BALLS ARE NOT THAT BIG: ARCHIVE, 
http://yourballsarenotthatbig.tumblr.com/archive/2011/9 (last visited July 30, 2015). 
 152.  MEN TAKING UP TOO MUCH SPACE ON THE TRAIN: ARCHIVE, 
http://mentakingup2muchspaceonthetrain.tumblr.com/archive (last visited July 30, 2015). 
 153.  Emma G. Fitzsimmons, A Scourge is Spreading. M.T.A.’s Cure? Dude, Close Your Legs, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/nyregion/MTA-targets-
manspreading-on-new-york-city-subways.html?_r=0. 
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mystery—even though the movement’s message is surely not: men, it is not 
okay to sit with your legs wide open on public transit and take up more than 
your share of the train. 
Though the name and early adoption of the meme has feminist 
overtones—creating awareness of how men often feel entitled to take up 
more public space than women—the complaint is also about a larger misuse 
or abuse of the commons.  Using the hashtag “#manspreading,” public 
transportation riders across the world can draw attention to this violation.  A 
typical post contains a picture, often only from the shoulders down, of a 
man guilty of such a violation combined with subject-relevant hashtags and 
occasional editorial comment.154  Some blogs aggregate or curate such 
pictures posted on Twitter or Instagram; others recirculate pictures in a 
humorous way, adding photo-shopped images in between legs, and comical 
captions.155 
As a meme, manspreading was inherently viral and decentralized, but 
it was also powerful.  In 2015, the Metropolitan Transit Authority, which 
oversees New York City’s subway system, released public service ads 











The message, posted on subway cars and on subway platforms, was 
part of a larger “courtesy counts” campaign that was put forth by the MTA, 
which included other requests such as letting others off the train before 
                                                          
 154.  See e.g., Oliver Bjrklund (@OliverBjrklund), TWITTER (July 17, 2015, 4:18 PM), 
https://twitter.com/OliverBjrklund/status/622138378247643136; Parantha Alley 
(@ParanthaAlley), TWITTER (June 14, 2015, 9:57 PM), 
https://twitter.com/ParanthaAlley/status/610264948581773313; Siân de Freyssinet (@pinkyde), 
TWITTER (Apr. 21, 2015, 11:24 AM), https://twitter.com/pinkyde/status/590536528478281728. 
 155.  SAVING ROOM FOR CATS, http://savingroomforcats.tumblr.com/ (last visited July 30, 
2015); ONE BRO TWO SEATS, http://onebrotwoseats.tumblr.com/ (last visited July 30, 2015). 
 156.  MTA: COURTESY COUNTS, 
http://web.mta.info/nyct/service/CourtesyCounts.htm#DUDESTOPTHESPREAD (last visited 
July 30, 2015). 
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getting on; giving a seat to the disabled, elderly, or pregnant; and not using 
the subway pole for dancing. 
The manspreading meme is a great example of how online shaming 
can be used effectively, but this could be in part because it differs 
dramatically from the instances above in that it is not about shaming the 
norm violator, but instead, the violation.  This addresses one of Nussbaum’s 
main concerns with shaming: that the purpose of most online shaming is to 
isolate a norm violator by burdening them with a degraded identity.157  
Focusing the shame on the act eliminates the amplification of uncalibrated 
punishment, the conflation of the social meaning of the act with the 
violator, and minimizes the necessity of accuracy. 
But the success of manspreading is certainly the exception.  As shown 
above, online shaming can be, and often is, inaccurate, overdetermined, and 
uncalibrated.  The following are current and potential solutions to these 
issues with online shaming. 
A.  Normative Conscriptions on Shaming 
Just as shame is used to enforce norm violations, sometimes certain 
norm enforcement actions will violate norms themselves, and in turn be 
shamed.  Using the structure from earlier, the following demonstrates how 
Richards’s and Smith’s story took just such a circular path: 
 
Here is a norm: 
 
And here is an act: 
 
  
                                                          
 157.  NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 172–221. 




Sexism is bad. 
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And here is a chain of consequences stemming from the social 
meaning of that act: 
 
 
                       


















Though Richards first capitalized on what she saw as a clear norm 
violation to shame the offender, but the legitimacy of the underlying norm 
violation (the statements were made privately, and perhaps not sexist at all) 
coupled with the amplitude and gravity of the shaming effects 
(Commentator lost job), triggered new norm violations and set into motion 
counter-norm enforcement (shaming).  The result is a type of feedback loop 
to enforce norms even when the norm enforcement might be in conflict 
with the norm that was violated, even though shaming Richards might be a 
convoluted, somewhat ironic punishment for her supposed wrongful 
shaming of Smith.  In this way, one might argue, norms are capable of 
Blogger and post violates 
other norms favoring 
privacy.  
 
I should be careful not to 
violate social norms against 
sexism or I could be shamed 
like Male Commenter. 
 
Male Commenter has violated norms 
against sexism. 
Blogger writes post denouncing 
Commenter as sexist for private 
comments, posting Commenter’s 
picture and calling for his firing. 
 
Third-party blog post on news media 
site and social media exposure 
condemning Blogger for exposing 
Commenter. 
 
I should be careful that a 
norm violation has 
occurred before I act to 
enforce it. 
 
I better not bully 
people online or I 
could be shamed 
like Blogger. 
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policing themselves, changing and issuing recursive punishments and 
updates in an ever-changing dynamic of enforcement and evolution. 
But this would be a drastic oversimplification.  Counter-norm 
enforcement does little to address or amend the underlying problems with 
online shaming, and in fact only builds on them.  In Richards’s case, for 
example, the social meaning of her online shaming might be that she 
violated a norm against privacy or it could simply be cyber harassment by a 
factional group.  Moreover, shaming Richards does nothing to curtail or end 
the online shaming of Smith, and perhaps only adds to the indeterminacy of 
each party’s shaming. 
Thus, it is easy to see how trusting counter-norm enforcement to 
regulate norms entirely could easily lead to a scorched-earth scenario and a 
worsening of the online shame culture. 
B.  Legal Conscriptions on Shaming 
Unlike with social norm enforcement, when the state punishes, it gives 
specific social meaning to the punishment, calibrates that punishment, and 
provides a process to attempt to ensure that the correct person and crime is 
being punished.  These are all qualities that are missing from online 
shaming, so it might seem natural to look to the government for solutions, 
but that remedy is not without its own drawbacks.  Part I.V.B.1 examines 
existing legal remedies and proposed legislation to curb online shaming, 
cyber harassment, and cyber bullying. 
1.  Defamation, Libel and Emotional Distress 
It is worth immediately noting that one kind of legal remedy is already 
a relatively effective protection against unhinged shaming: defamation law.  
Cooley’s story is a perfect example of this:  though wrongfully shamed and 
forced to leave his small town, his eventual legal victory exposed his 
attacker and the lies on which his shame was built, and allowed him to 
return to his community, almost as if nothing had happened. 
But a number of practical concerns limit the utility of defamation law 
as a way to curb shaming.  Foremost, to sue for defamation, the statements 
made against the potential plaintiff must be false.158  In Cooley’s case, his 
shaming was based entirely on lies.  This was a necessary element to him 
using libel as a remedy against his shaming.  But had it not been—and until 
it was publicly exposed as such by a trial—Cooley’s shaming was very 
similar to that seen by Sacco and Richards.  Had the Topix postings against 
Cooley been anything other than baseless falsifications, if they had even 
                                                          
 158.  Truth is always a defense to defamation.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A 
(1969). 
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potentially contained elements of truth, Cooley’s suit might not have been 
so successful. Moreover, as was the case with Sacco and Richards, it is 
often the offenders’ true, self-publicized actions or words that lead to the 
shaming, making them ineligible for any kind of defamation relief.159 
Sacco, Richards and Filipovic160 might have tort claims for intentional 
or reckless infliction of emotional distress with “extreme and outrageous 
conduct.”161  Especially for Filipovic, the personal attacks, rape threats, and 
communication with her would potentially qualify as extreme and 
outrageous conduct because “it falls outside the norms of decency.”162 
But litigation is a costly and timely remedy.  Years can—and often 
do—pass before a case is settled or tried.  In the meantime, the shaming can 
continue, or even accelerate.  In Cooley’s case, he left Blairsville for the 
years during which he sought to uncover his accuser and sue for 
defamation.  Though his jury verdict restored his reputation, the defendant 
was judgment-proof, so Cooley will never be compensated for the time he 
lost to his online shaming.  This, as well as issues with anonymous users, 
are often a problem with pursuing judgments against online harassers.163 
2.  Right to Be Forgotten or Information Privacy Speech 
Restrictions 
A libel judgment might be a type of remedy for the loss of procedural 
justice inflicted on Cooley, but what recourse would Sacco and Richards 
have for any kind of procedure or “measured punishment”? 
One solution seems to be legal recognition of a new right—arguably a 
new norm—the “right to be forgotten.”164  The right to be forgotten 
“reflects the claim of an individual to have certain data deleted so that third 
persons can no longer trace them.”165  Though debated globally since the 
early 2000s, the right to be forgotten was only recognized as an established 
                                                          
 159.  The analysis for relief would also be different if the target of shaming happened to be a 
public figure.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1969). 
 160.  For cases like Filipovic or Richards where posters continuously updated online threads 
threatening rape and murder, criminal harassment charges might seem an obvious solution.  But 
because much of their harassment was posted online and not directed to them specifically, the 
abuse falls outside most states’ harassment laws.  CITRON, supra note 29, at 143. 
 161.  CITRON, supra note 29, at 121. 
 162.  Id. at 122 (citing Benjamin C. Zipursky, Snyder v. Phelps, Outrageousness and the Open 
Texture of Tort Law, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 473 (2011) and CITRON, supra note 29, at 133–34). 
 163.  CITRON, supra note 29, at 122. 
 164.  This, in some ways, might approach the “dignity” arguments espoused by Nussbaum and 
Massaro. 
 165.  Rolf H. Weber, The Right to Be Forgotten: More Than a Pandora’s Box?, 2 JIPITEC 
121 (2011), http://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-2-2-2011/3084/jipitec%202%20-%20a%20-
%20weber.pdf. 
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legal precedent in May 2014 by the European Court of Justice.166  Since 
then, the scope of its enforcement has been widely debated, with major 
companies like Google resisting global application.167   Though it might 
seem that the right to be forgotten is a natural solution to the fears created 
by excessive and unchecked public shaming, the right to be forgotten runs 
up against another highly-valued norm and legal protection: free speech. 
Thus, on the one hand, we increasingly value our privacy rights on the 
Internet, and on the other, the fear that protecting those rights could lead to 
censorship.168 
Professor Eugene Volokh has been at the fore of this debate.  He 
argues that in recognizing a right to be forgotten—or a “right to control 
your communication of personally identifiable information about me”—we 
face the difficult problem of creating a “right to have the government stop 
you from speaking about me.”169  Volokh spells out the future of the 
possible incantations of this right against American First Amendment law 
and associated free speech jurisprudence, ultimately concluding that any 
restrictions on speech around personal information would be “constitutional 
under current doctrine only if they are imposed by contract, express or 
implied.”170  These exceptions would have to be drawn incredibly narrowly, 
in order to avoid “unintended consequences” to the right to free speech.171 
But the appeal of the right to be forgotten remains intuitive and 
undeniable, arguably because we have now seen the power of unchecked 
public shaming.172   Information speech restrictions like the right to be 
forgotten are appealing because they speak to a new collective danger 
exemplified by Sacco and Richards: in going about your daily life, your 
actions might suddenly be held under a microscope, or broadcast to the 
world, and replayed on infinite loop.  The battle between protection from 
this fear and loss of personal liberty and privacy is of course a familiar, and 
complicated, legal battle. 
                                                          
 166.  David Streitfeld, European Court Lets Users Erase Records on Web, N.Y. TIMES (May 
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 169.  Id. 
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C.  Purely Private Action 
Some of the private efforts of shamed individuals to reclaim their 
reputation and end their shaming demonstrate the power of private action to 
conscript shaming or cyber harassment. 
The story of Filipovic is central here, as she was able to use the same 
qualities of the Internet that allowed strangers to harass her to recover her 
online presence.  Of course, Filipovic had the advantage of already being a 
“public figure” online and thus being able to rally a faction of supporters to 
aid her, but businesses have sprung up to manufacture the same result.  
Reputation.com is one of the foremost online reputation management 
companies.  “We believe individuals and businesses have the right to 
control how they look online,” states the Reputation.com’s “About Us” 
page.  Their business model is a paid-for service that can be available to any 
business or public or private individual.173  It works in a similar, but more 
sophisticated way to Filipovic’s approach: assailing search algorithms with 
new webpages, pictures, and text, in a “choreographed” way, to maximize 
the staying power of the new reputational information.174 
Issuing apologies are also moderately effective in curbing shaming.  In 
Smith’s case, his apology for his sexist statement curtailed some of the 
vitriol, though it had the side effect of making Richards a new target for 
shame.  But in the recent example of Walter Palmer, the Midwestern dentist 
who sparked global outrage after killing Cecil the Lion, an apology letter 
did very little to assuage the worldwide torrent of shame.175 
Such methods of reclaiming online presence are arguably effective, but 
they are not without limits.176  Like litigation, such solutions are costly and 
timely, and they are also limited to the Internet—they can do little to 
nothing to repair real-world damage that happens as a result of online 
shaming. 
D.  Refreshing and Re-Shaming the Debate 
Far from using shame as a governmental tool, there is now a growing 
sense that online shaming is something we want to control; but any 
regulation must be balanced against competing normative and legal values 
like free speech.  As Danielle Citron writes in Hate Crimes in Cyberspace, 
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“[a] legal agenda against cyber-harassment . . . can balance civil rights and 
civil liberties for the good of each.”177  This is also true of legal reform 
around online shaming.  Though there are not currently any absolute 
solutions to curtailing online shaming, we can learn much by considering 
online shaming within the framework of social norms and the shame 
debate, and the lessons of those who have been shamed. 
1.  New Taxonomies: Distinctions Between Online Shaming, Cyber 
Harassment, and Cyber Bullying 
Though they are often conflated, online shaming, cyber bullying and 
cyber harassment are very different things.  This Article began with a 
theoretical definition of shaming that appended “real or perceived norm 
violation” to the definition of harassment.  As the examples in Part II supra 
show, this is an important distinction.  Unlike the other people described, 
Filipovic and countless others like her violated no norms and were accused 
of violating no norms.  The online shame, hate, and vitriol that surrounded 
them, destroyed their online presence, and upended their real lives was 
arbitrary, capricious, and committed by small factions of online users.  
Citron’s calls for reform to criminal stalking and harassment laws, de-
anonymization of users and removal of Communications Decency Act 
Section 230 liability for the “worst offenders” of Internet sites, are all 
critical and measured proposals to solve the serious issues of cyber 
harassment and cyber bullying. 
But where does Adria Richards fit in that taxonomy?  It can certainly 
be argued that Richards violated a norm, but it could just as easily be 
argued that misogynist Internet factions targeted her like they targeted 
Filipovic.  Richards is a victim of online shaming and cyber harassment.  
Her example demonstrates how easily and quickly events and normative 
enforcement can change on the Internet, and how rapidly it can deteriorate. 
One thing is clear: Richards’s violation of a norm does not justify her 
cyber harassment.  Nor does it justify her online shaming.  The problems 
that arise in online shaming—inaccuracy, indeterminate meaning, and lack 
of calibration—are why it is an ineffective and intolerable punishment. 
2.  Shaming Acts, Not People 
As Nussbaum argued in the shame debate, the danger of shaming is in 
ostracizing the norm-violator from society by marking them with a 
degraded identity (in the case of online shaming, a horrible Google history).  
But if you attach that stigma to an act, you can accomplish the same 
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effect—removing norm violation—without the problems caused by online 
shaming and the danger of sliding into the realm of cyber harassment. 
Thus, manspreading was a successful use of online shaming because it 
targeted the act of norm violation rather than a specific person.  This 
decoupling of norm violator from norm violation should be continued and 
encouraged in online shaming and in future regulation that might address 
online shaming. 
3.  Best Practices for Action 
A successful defamation suit meant Cooley could return to his life as if 
“nothing had happened.”  Reverse Google bombing and online reputation 
management have the power to finally end the shame meted out by the 
Internet’s infinite memory.  These solutions work because they speak to the 
problems we have with public shaming.  A defamation judgment is a 
powerful solution to shaming because it provides accuracy.  It also uses the 
government’s power as a loudspeaker and trusted arbiter to counter the 
amplifying effects of the Internet.  Online reputation management is 
effective because it can change what is being discussed and calibrate the 
punishment of online shaming. 
Though these are seemingly disparate resolutions both in substance 
and procedure they are alike in a key way: neither of them involve 
censoring the shaming, but rather adding to the public action and thus 
changing and quelling its meaning.  “The Internet is forever,” said Russell 
Stookey, the attorney for Cooley, “that’s what I tell all of my clients, that’s 
what I tell all of my children.”178 
So what would implementation of such a solution look like?  The 
possibilities are wide-ranging.  At the most broad: a governmental watch-
dog agency to oversee and administratively adjudicate Internet “dignitary” 
harms and issuing financial sanctions, or even simply letters of judgment 
that state an offender’s contrition and acknowledging the extent of their 
shame.  This would harness both the government’s promise of accuracy and 
its power of publicity.179  Such letters could be posted online by the 
shaming victims, or alternatively, a government-mandated notification 
could appear at the top of search results for a shamed person’s name, 
linking to the agency’s letter and a statement of apology to the victim.  
Alternatively, Internet Service Providers and major Internet companies like 
Google, Yahoo, and Twitter could implement their own internal agency to 
review online shaming and cyber harassment claims, though this is perhaps 
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even more unlikely than a government watchdog group given the liability 
this would expose them to under current law.180  Regardless, the additive 
nature of this solution makes it even more viable, as it addresses many of 
the concerns around the information privacy speech debate and the right to 
be forgotten.  Those solutions favor government-facilitated takedown or 
removal of speech that is deemed offensive, an obvious anathema to free 
speech rights.  Creating a process and system for publication would involve 
no level of censorship, but rather, an opportunity to change and inform the 
social meaning. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Online shame is problematic in large part because it is an inaccurate, 
indeterminate, and uncalibrated form of punishment.  In creating a 
regulatory solution to online shaming, the framework of social norms, 
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